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Comment
Combatting AIDS's Acoustic Shadow: Illinois
Addresses the Problems of Criminal Transfer
of HIV
I.

INTRODUCTION

No modem disease has struck society so stunningly and convincingly' as acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS).
AIDS is a life-threatening disease that presently has no cure.2
AIDS's rate of destruction 3 is equalled only by the disease's emotional impact.' AIDS has caused world-wide 5 panic and despair 6
1. See Note, Glover v. Eastern Nebraska Community Office of Retardation: Federal
Court Invalidates AIDS Policy, 57 UMKC L. REv. 369 (1989) (new case of AIDS reported in the United States every fourteen minutes; as of July 1988, there were 69,085
cases of AIDS in the United States alone). Between 1987 and 1988, death from AIDS
became the sixth leading cause of years of potential life lost in the United States. Chronic
Disease Reportv Deaths from Nine Chronic Diseases-UnitedStates, 39 MORBIDITY &
MORTALrrY WEEKLY REP. 17, 19-20 (1990) (according to Dr. Robert A. Hahn, medical
epidemiologist in the Centers for Disease Control's Epidemiology Program Office). In
July 1989, the Centers for Disease Control announced the 100,000th case of AIDS in the
United States. Id. A study by the General Accounting Office estimated that at least
300,000 cases of AIDS will be diagnosed by 1991. Ia
2. "Successful development and testing of a vaccine against HIV [human immunodeficiency virus] is likely to be a relatively long and arduous task. The first vaccine
against hepatitis B virus, a virus that had been recognized and studied for decades, took
more than 17 years to develop and test." Young, The Role of the FDA in the Effort
Against AIDS, 103 PuB. HEALTH REP. 242, 245 (1988).
3. It is estimated that in San Francisco alone, 9966 to 12,767 deaths will result from
AIDS by June 1993. Lemp, Payne, Rutherford, Hessol, Winkelstein, Wiley, Moss,
Chaisson & Chen, Projectionsof AIDS Morbidity and Mortality in San Francisco, 263 J.
A.M.A. 1497 (1990).
4. See, eg., Raytheon Co. v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 212 Cal. App. 3d
1242, 261 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1989); Psychology and AIDS, 43 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 835
(1988) (special issue).
5. Interestingly, such disparate places as China and Massachusetts report increases in
AIDS cases. The Chinese government recently admitted that HIV has infected more
Chinese citizens than foreign residents and is spreading on the strength of drug addicts in
a particular border region. AIDS in China, AIDS L. & LITIGATION REP. MONTHLY
REv., Apr. 1990, at 22. Similarly, Massachusetts Health and Human Services Secretary
Philip Johnston lamented that AIDS "remains the most serious public health problem
that we face." Cases Rise Among Minorities, State Health System Hit Hard, 5 AIDS
Pol'y.& L. (BNA) No. 6, at 7 (Apr. 4, 1990). More than 3000 cases of AIDS have been
reported in Massachusetts, and 10 times as many state residents are estimated to be infected with HIV. Id
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that has lessened 7 only recently in response to the parade of catastrophes of the week, month, and year. Behind the headlines, individuals, families, businesses, scientists, and governments battle a
scourge that will not go away.8
The impact of AIDS has not escaped the attention of law students, lawyers, 9 judges,10 law enforcement officials, I legislatures,' 2
6. See J. SHILTS, AND THE BAND PLAYED ON: PEOPLE, POLITICS, AND THE AIDS
EPIDEMIC (1987) (giving an overview of public reaction concerning the AIDS epidemic);
Schulman, AIDS Discrimination:Its Nature, Meaning, and Function, 12 NOVA L.J. 1113,
1115 (1988) (linking the public's fear of AIDS and human sexuality, helplessness, mental
illness, and death).
7. Former Surgeon General C. Everett Koop testified before a United States House of
Representatives subcommittee and warned of an increasing national complacency towards AIDS and urged the government to step up its response to the disease. Koop
claimed that the federal government was not cooperating closely enough with state and
local governments attempting to combat the epidemic. Koop Warns Congress About
AIDS Complacency, AIDS L. & LITIGATION REP. MONTHLY REv., Feb.-Mar. 1990, at
14.
8. The National Center for Health Services Research and Health Care Technology
Assessment projects that 56,000 AIDS cases will be diagnosed in 1990; 70,000 in 1991;
87,000 in 1992; and 104,000 in 1993. Updated Forecastsfor Costs of AIDS, AIDS L. &
LITIGATION REP. MONTHLY REv., Feb.-Mar. 1990, at 16.
9. For example, the New York City Bar Association has called for restricted access to
HIV testing results, mandatory on-going education of all criminal justice employees
about HIV, the supplying of basic AIDS information at the criminal booking stage, the
implementation of a resource bank with the latest scientific information and leading cases
available for defendants, and the expeditious and consistent treatment of all HIV infected
offenders. AIDS L. REP., Oct. 1989, at 2-3; see AM. BAR ASS'N, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION POLICY ON AIDS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1989).
10. See generally Weber, AIDS. Legal Issues in Search of a Cure, 14 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 572 (1988); Lacayo, Assault with a Deadly Virus: What Should Courts Do When
AIDS Is Allegedly Used as a Weapon?, TIME, July 20, 1987, at 63. The AIDS issue even
impacts courtroom behavior. See, e.g., Wiggins v. State, 315 Md. App. 232, 554 A.2d
356 (1989) (appellate court reversed defendant's conviction after the trial judge improperly gave his court officers authority to wear gloves in court while in the presence of the
defendant who was a homosexual). But see Commonwealth v. Johnson, 777 S.W.2d 876,
880 (Ky. 1989) (agreeing with Wiggins that "raising the specter of AIDS, without substantial relevance in bringing this to the attention of the jury, may result in unfair prejudice," but holding that a police officer's testimony that he wore rubber gloves while
searching defendant's apartment did not improperly influence the jury), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 1510, 1823 (1990). See generally Earl & Kavanaugh, Meeting the AIDS Epidemic
in the Courtroom: PracticalSuggestions in Litigating Your FirstAIDS Case, 12 NOVA
L.J. 1203 (1988).
11. See generally Goodwin v. Turner, 908 F.2d 1395 (8th Cir. 1990) (upholding regulation of the Bureau of Prisons restricting inmate procreation, including artificial insemination of wives by male inmates, and denying inmate's request to be tested to ensure he
was free of sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV); Farmer v. Moritsugu, 742 F.
Supp. 525 (W.D. Wis. 1990) (prisoner claimed he was denied equal protection by prison
policy that did not allow him to work in food service because of his AIDS condition);
Deutsch v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 737 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (prisoner
claimed that constitutional rights under eighth amendment violated by being assigned
cellmate who tested positive for HIV antibodies); Welch v. Addington, 734 F. Supp. 765
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and even plaintiffs. 3 Attempts to curb the spread of AIDS run the
gamut from the criminalization of certain conduct believed to
transmit the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) to the wearing
of rubber gloves by police officers at gay rallies. Most recently, the
Illinois legislature enacted a statute addressing the criminal transfer of HIV.14 In so doing, the legislature sought to avoid problems
associated with using traditional criminal statutes to deter inten(N.D. Tex. 1990) (inmate brought civil rights action against jail personnel for allegedly
placing him in the same cell as inmate who had tested positive for AIDS); Wilson v.
Franceschi, 735 F. Supp. 395 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (inmate seeking relief against physician at
correctional facility for delay in administering AZT for treatment of inmate's AIDSrelated symptoms); Griner v. United States, No. 89-3493 (D. Kan. Jan. 31, 1990)
(WESTLAW, DCT database) (postconviction relief sought by prisoner with AIDS to
have sentence reduced due to deteriorating medical condition); Jackson v. Fauver, No.
89-871 (D.N.J. Jan. 18, 1990) (WESTLAW, DCT database) (prisoner infected with HIV
sought relief claiming that defendants failed to provide adequate medical care); Harris v.
Thigpen, 727 F. Supp. 1564 (M.D. Ala. 1990) (Alabama state prison inmates who were
administratively segregated as AIDS carriers brought action against prison officials
claiming that Alabama's testing of inmates for AIDS upon induction and discharge from
prison violated their constitutional rights); Feigley v. Fulcomer, 720 F. Supp. 475 (M.D.
Pa. 1989) (inmate brought action against prison officials alleging that they violated his
eighth amendment rights by not protecting him from contracting AIDS); Hawley v. Evans, 716 F. Supp. 601 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (prison inmates who tested positive for HIV
brought action alleging that they were not receiving adequate treatment); Rodriguez v.
Coughlin, No. 87-1577 (W.D.N.Y. June 2, 1989) (WESTLAW, DCT database) (inmate
alleged that employees of New York Department of Corrections violated his constitutional right to privacy by disclosing the fact that he was suffering from AIDS to other
prisoners); Doe v. Meachum, 126 F.R.D. 452 (D. Conn. 1989) (inmates challenged policies of Connecticut Department of Corrections regarding inmates infected with AIDS);
Cameron v. Metcuz, 705 F. Supp. 454 (N.D. Ind. 1989) (action against prison officials for
their alleged failure to protect the plaintiff from attack by another inmate who had been
diagnosed as having AIDS); Doe v. Coughlin, 697 F. Supp. 1234 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (judge
enjoined correctional institution from making involuntary transfers of inmates who tested
positive for HIV to any separate dormitory set aside for such purposes); Lewis v. Prison
Health Servs., No. 88-1247 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 1988) (WESTLAW, DCT database)
(granting summary judgment against prisoner who was diagnosed as HIV positive on his
claim that he was improperly segregated from fellow inmates in county prison); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 7500 (West 1989) (stating that AIDS has the "frightening potential to
spread faster within confined areas, such as prison"); Raburn, Prisoners with AIDS: The
Use of Electronic Processing, 24 CRIM. L. BULL. 213 (1988).
12. See generally Clark, AIDS Prevention: Legislative Options, 16 AM. J. OF L. &
MED. 107 (1990); Comment, A Legal Guide for the Education of Legislators Facing the
Inevitable Question.: AIDS: The Problem Is Real- What Do We Do Now?, 13 J. CONTEMP. L. 121, 131 n.68 (1987).
13. One court has even been faced with an "AIDS phobia" case. In Hare v. State,
143 Misc. 2d 281, 539 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (Ct. Cl. 1989), neither the plaintiff nor the defendant were shown to be HIV-infected. The plaintiff sought recovery for his fear that he
might contract AIDS from the defendant's biting of plaintiff. There was evidence that
plaintiff had become depressed, had lost thirty pounds, and had become withdrawn from
his family. Yet the court refused to award damages for mental anguish, finding that
plaintiff's fears were not based on any objective findings.
14. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-16.2 (1989).
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tional and reckless transfer of HIV. The boundaries of this statute
are sure to be tested on several levels as Illinois prosecutors begin
to charge individuals with the criminal transfer of HIV.
This Comment first discusses the various state criminal law responses to the AIDS epidemic. The Comment then focuses on the
Illinois legislature's response to the AIDS crisis by examining its
criminalization of certain HIV-transmitting behavior. Finally, the
Illinois legislature's response to AIDS is evaluated with an eye toward future litigation concerns.
II.

TRADITIONAL CRIMINAL RESPONSES TO

HIV

TRANSFER

Traditionally, courts relied primarily on existing criminal statutes to prosecute the criminal transfer of HIV. 15 The charges used
range from assault to manslaughter to murder. This approach encountered problems. Courts attempted to confront a unique and
modern problem with criminal laws developed to combat age-old
problems. An examination of these cases shows that existing criminal laws are il-suited to the vagaries of HIV transfer. Particular
problems arise with (1) proving the requisite intent for the underlying crime, (2) fitting the specific conduct into the narrow framework of existing crimes, and (3) establishing coherent and
consistent sentencing procedures.
A. Intent

Courts have had particular trouble defining the intent required
to prosecute HIV transfer using traditional criminal sanctions.
This problem is apparent in the disparate outcomes in different
courts facing similar cases.
15. See United States v. Kazenbach, 824 F.2d 649 (8th Cir. 1987) (conviction upheld
of inmate with AIDS who scratched, bit, and spat on officers in prison); Brock v. State,
555 So. 2d 285 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989) (defendant guilty of assault after biting prison
officer on the arm while confined to AIDS unit); Johnetta v. Municipal Court, 218 Cal.
App. 3d 1255, 267 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1990) (defendant charged with felony assault sought to
block AIDS test); Barlow v. Superior Court, 236 Cal. Rptr. 134 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987)
(defendant tried on two counts of battery against police officer after biting officer in struggle); State v. Sherouse, 536 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (defendant tried on two
counts of attempted manslaughter after offering to engage in sex while knowing that she
was infected with AIDS); In re Anonymous, 156 A.D.2d 1028, 549 N.Y.S.2d 308 (1989)
(petitioner tried on attempted murder charges after attempting to infect police officer
with HIV by biting him); People v. Durham, 146 Misc. 2d 913, 553 N.Y.S.2d 944 (Sup.
Ct. 1990) (defendant committed rape after announcing to victim that he was AIDS carrier); State v. Guayante, 99 Or. App. 649, 783 P.2d 1030 (1989) (defendant's infection
with AIDS was aggravating factor in sentencing on charges of sexual abuse, rape, and
sodomy).
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State v. Haines 16 provides a liberal example of the application of
traditional criminal sanctions to the prosecution of potentially
HIV-transmitting conduct. In Haines, an Indiana appellate court
reinstated defendant Donald Haines's conviction for attempted
murder after the trial court had found there was insufficient evi-7
dence to show that Haines's actions could have transmitted HIV.'
Haines had been diagnosed as having AIDS.' 8 Distraught,
Haines unsuccessfully attempted suicide. When police and
paramedics, responding to the report of a possible suicide, arrived
at Haines's apartment, Haines screamed that he had AIDS and
that he was going to kill anyone who tried to help him.1 9 Haines
used his slashed wrists to spray blood at a police officer, and he bit
and spit blood at two paramedics. 20 Haines was charged with three
counts of attempted murder and three counts of battery.2'
A jury convicted Haines on all charges.22 The trial court then
granted Haines's motion for judgment on the evidence as to the
attempted murder conviction.23 The trial court reasoned that the
state had not met its burden because there was no reasonable inference that Haines's conduct constituted a substantial step towards
murder.24
The appellate court reversed and reinstated the attempted murder conviction. 2' The appellate court held that Haines's conduct
need not be capable of effectuating murder.26 Instead, the court
concluded that the prosecution only needed to show that Haines
did all that he believed necessary to bring about the intended result, regardless of whether the result actually was possible. 27 The
court found that Haines's knowledge of his condition coupled with
his words and actions provided sufficient evidence of intent to commit murder.28
A California appellate court faced a similar problem but reached
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

545 N.E.2d 834 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989).

Id at 841.
Id at 835.
Id

Id
Id
Id. at 836.
Id.
Id at 837.
Id at 841.
Id. at 839.
Id at 838.
Id. at 837.
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a different result. In Barlow v. Superior Court,29 the court denied
the prosecution's request for an order directing the defendant,
Brian Barlow, to submit to an HIV test. Barlow had scuffled with
police who were monitoring a gay freedom day parade in which
Barlow was participating. During the scuffle Barlow told the police that he was a homosexual and that the officers had better beware because he might have AIDS. 30 During the altercation,
Barlow bit one policemen on the shoulder and bit another on the
knuckle. 3 ' The police charged Barlow with attempted murder and
assault with intent to commit great bodily harm.32
The prosecution argued that the HIV test was necessary to show
Barlow's intent to kill and to inflict great bodily injury by transmitting AIDS,33 an essential element of both crimes. In denying the
prosecution's request, the court ruled that the test would not reveal
evidence of intent.34 The court reasoned that, because the injuries
which Barlow allegedly inflicted occurred five weeks before the test
was to be taken, the results would be irrelevant to a showing of
intent at the time of the crimes.35
Finally, a Florida decision dealt with another problem with
demonstrating intent in AIDS-related prosecutions for sexual behavior. In State v. Sherouse,36 the court upheld the dismissal of
charges based upon the prosecution's failure to prove the intent
element of voluntary manslaughter.37 In Sherouse, the defendant,
Elizabeth Sherouse, had tested positive for HIV, had been informed that the virus was deadly, and had been told HIV could be
transmitted through sexual intercourse. 38 The prosecution claimed
29. 236 Cal. Rptr. 134 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
30. Id at 136.
31. Id.
32. Id
33. Id
34. Id at 138.
35. Id In Johnetta v. Municipal Court, 218 Cal. App. 3d 1260, 267 Cal. Rptr. 666
(1990), the California Court of Appeal dealt with a similar request and using constitutional analysis, reached a different conclusion. In Johnetta, the request for testing was
made pursuant to a state statute that specifically provided for AIDS testing of defendants
accused of interfering with peace officers by, among other things, inflicting a subcutaneous bite. Id. at 1262, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 669. The defendant contested the constitutionality of that statute as an unreasonable search and seizure. The court balanced the state's
interest in preventing the spread of AIDS against what it defined as the minimal intrusion
of testing. The court held that the state's interest prevailed and upheld the statute's constitutionality. Id. at 1282, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 683. For a similar holding and analysis, see
People v. Durham, 146 Misc. 2d 913, 553 N.Y.S.2d 944 (Sup. Ct. 1990).
36. 536 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
37. Id. at 1195 (Cobb, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 1194 (Cobb, J., concurring).
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that she ignored these warnings and offered to engage in sexual
intercourse for money with two men on two separate occasions
without informing them of her condition or telling them that the
39
virus could be transmitted.
Sherouse was charged with two counts of attempted manslaughter, but the trial court dismissed the case because it found no evidence that her conduct evidenced an intent to kill.' 0 On appeal,
the state argued that Sherouse's intent to commit the unlawful act
of prostitution while carrying the virus inferred her intent to kill. 41
The state claimed, therefore, that only the intent to commit the
precipitating act, prostitution, not the intent to kill, needed to be
shown.42 The court rejected this argument, concluding that intent
to kill was an essential element of attempted manslaughter.43
B.

The Narrow Scope of Existing CriminalLaws

Another major problem courts face when trying to impose traditional criminal sanctions for HIV transfer is that of fitting the
unique circumstances of HIV transfer into the traditional definitions of existing crimes. For example, in United States v. Moore,'
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the conviction of defendant, James Moore, for assault with a deadly and dangerous
weapon. Moore had tested positive as an HIV carrier.45 Shortly
after learning of his condition, Moore bit two correctional officers
during a struggle while Moore was in the hospital. 46
The indictment charged Moore with two counts of assault with a
deadly and dangerous weapon-the deadly and dangerous weapon
being Moore's mouth and teeth. 47 Although the court held that
the prosecution had not proved whether HIV could be transmitted
by a bite, it let the conviction stand because, irrespective of
whether HIV could be transmitted by biting, Moore's mouth and
teeth could be considered deadly and dangerous weapons.48
39. Id. (Cobb, J., concurring).
40. Id. (Cobb, J., concurring).
41. Id. (Cobb, J., concurring).
42. Id. (Cobb, J., concurring).
43. Id. at 1195 (Cobb, J., concurring).
44. 846 F.2d 1163 (8th Cir. 1988).
45. Id. at 1164.
46. Id. "Biting" cases present a common factual scenario in which many of the
problems discussed in this article arise. For further examples of this type of case, see
United States v. Kazenbach, 824 F.2d 649 (8th Cir. 1987); In re Anonymous, 156 A.D.
2d 1028, 549 N.Y.S.2d (1989).
47. Moore, 846 F.2d at 1164.
48. Id at 1168.
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In Brock v. State,49 the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals considered whether the defendant's conduct could transmit HIV. The
defendant Adam Brock was a prisoner confined to the "AIDS
Unit" of a correctional facility.50 During a routine shakedown,
Brock fought with a correctional officer, and after being handcuffed, Brock bit the officer on the arm. The officer's injury was
treated and he was tested for HIV.. All tests were negative.5"
Brock subsequently was charged with attempted murder for biting
and breaking the skin5 of
the officer while knowingly being infected
2
with the AIDS virus.
The jury found Brock guilty of the lesser included offense of assault in the first degree, an element of which was use "of a deadly
weapon or a dangerous instrument. ' 53 Brock appealed his conviction, claiming that the state had failed to present a prima facie case
of assault in the first degree.54
On appeal, the court took judicial notice that AIDS is a lifethreatening disease and that contraction of HIV constitutes a serious physical injury.5 The court, however, would not take judicial
56
notice that biting was an effective means of transmitting HIV.
The court found that, although HIV might be transmittable
through a human bite, the trial produced no evidence that such
means of transmission was an established scientific fact. 7 Moreover, the court noted the unclear role of saliva in the transmission
of AIDS.58
In addition, the court found no evidence that Brock's bite caused
serious injury or was capable of causing the serious injury necessary for an assault conviction.5 9 More importantly, in overturning
Brock's conviction, the court stated there was no evidence that
Brock knew that HIV could be transmitted through a human
bite.'
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

555 So. 2d 285 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989).
Id. at 286.
Id.
Id. at 287.
Id. (citing ALA. CODE § 13A-6-20(a)(1) (1975)).
Id.
Id. at 287-88.
Id. at 288.
Id
Id.
Id.
Id.
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C.

Sentencing

Sentencing defendants for AIDS-related crimes presents three
problems. One issue is whether an AIDS victim's diminished life
expectancy should be a mitigating sentencing factor. Another
question is whether AIDS's demoralizing effect should be a mitigating circumstance for criminal behavior. Finally, courts face the
issue of whether intentional transfer of HIV is an aggravating factor in a prosecution for the underlying offense.
A pair of state court decisions have considered whether a defendant who is afflicted with HIV should be entitled to have his
sentence reduced. In People v. Watts,6 ' the defendant, Michael
Watts, was convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment in a
state correctional facility.62 On appeal, Watts argued that his sentence should be reduced because he tested positive for HIV.63 The
court denied his request, holding that "'HIV infection' is not, in
and of itself, a ground for reducing the otherwise appropriate and
bargained-for sentence which was imposed."" 4
Similarly, in Commonwealth v. O'Neil,65 the defendant Michael
O'Neil, who had tested positive for HIV, contended that incarceration of the physically infirm was cruel and unusual punishment
under the eighth amendment. 66 O'Neil claimed that his HIV condition ultimately would prove fatal; therefore, the trial court
should have considered alternatives to imprisonment because he
might die while in confinement. 67 The court rejected O'Neil's argument, concluding that, although it was possible O'Neil would
not live out his term, that fact alone did not make his punishment
per se cruel and unusual.68
Courts also have considered whether a defendant's HIV condition properly can explain why the defendant committed the crime
and, thus, justify a reduced sentence. In Brogdon v. State,69 the
defendant, Craig Brogdon, claimed he was extremely depressed after learning that he had HIV. His infection, Brogdon alleged,
61. 556 N.Y.S.2d 754 (1990).
62. Id. at 754.
63. Id.
64. Id.; see also People v.Chrzanowski, 147 A.D.2d 652, 538 N.Y.S.2d 55 (1989)
(holding that the defendant's affliction with HIV did not by itself warrant the reduction
of an otherwise appropriate sentence).
65. 393 Pa. Super. 111, 573 A.2d 1112 (1990).
66. Id. at 113, 573 A.2d at 1114.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 116, 573 A.2d at 1115.
69. 781 P.2d 1370 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).
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caused him to drink, leading to the car accident for which he was
charged with assault.7'
On appeal, Brogdon argued that his condition should have mitigated his sentence. 71 The appellate court rejected Brogdon's HIVinduced depression defense and upheld his sentence. 72 In so holding, the court noted that "an insubstantial jail sentence would convey the message that situational stress is an excuse for extreme
73
recklessness.
Conversely, in State v. Guayante,74 the defendant, Joseph
Guayante, argued that the trial court impermissibly considered his
knowledge of his AIDS affliction as an aggravating sentencing factor.75 The appellate court found that the trial court had imposed
concurrent sentences because Guayante had knowledge of his
AIDS affliction, not merely because he had AIDS.76 Thus,
Guayante's knowledge was held to be a proper factor in weighing
the sentencing alternatives. 7
Guayante points out that courts without guidance from HIVspecific statutes still may incorporate the defendant's knowledge of
his HIV condition when fashioning criminal sanctions for HIVrelated behavior. Therefore, although not convicted on a literal
HIV charge, the defendant's HIV condition will be expressly accounted for by these courts.
III.

THE ILLINOIS LEGISLATURE'S RESPONSE

As the AIDS epidemic has increased as a societal problem, 7s several states have enacted statutes to deal specifically with the
problems of prosecuting AIDS transmission and to replace the illdefined requirements of traditional criminal law. 79 In 1989, the Illinois legislature adopted its version of this modem approach by
70. Id at 1371.
71. Id
72. Id at 1372.
73. Id.
74. 99 Or. App. 649, 783 P.2d 1030 (1989).
75. Id at 650, 783 P.2d at 1031.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 651, 783 P.2d at 1032.
78. It should be noted that even though criminal punishments for the transmission of
AIDS flourish, so do AIDS related criminal laws that impose penalties on persons who
violate the rights of those infected with AIDS. Albert, Stewart & Vermeulen, Criminal
Law and Procedure, in AIDS PRACTICE MANUAL: A LEGAL AND EDUCATIONAL
GUIDE at VI-5 n.1 (2d ed. 1988).
79. These states include Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Ohio, Texas,
and Washington.
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enacting a statute that specifically addresses the criminal transmission of HIV.8 ° This statute is designed to allow Illinois prosecutors
to move away from AIDS prosecutions under traditional criminal
statutes and to provide specific sanctions for the criminal transmission of HIV/AIDS. In drafting the statute, the Illinois legislature
made certain that it would be applicable only to those who know
that they are infected with HIV or any other known causative
agent of AIDS."'
An individual will be subject to criminal sanctions under the
statute by engaging in one of three specified activities. First, a person can be prosecuted for criminal transmission of HIV due to
having engaged in intimate contact with another.8 2 To be considered intimate contact, the contact must be of a type capable of
transmitting HIV83 (e.g., sexual intercourse). Providing certain
body fluids for use by another will also be grounds for prosecu80. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-16.2 (1989). The statute in full reads as
follows:
§ 12-16.2. Criminal Transmission of HIV. (a) A person commits criminal
transmission of HIV when he or she, knowing that he or she is infected with
HIV:
(1) engages in intimate contact with another;
(2) transfers, donates, or provides his or her blood, tissue, semen, organs, or
other potentially infectious body fluids for transfusion, transplantation, insemination, or other administration to another; or
(3) dispenses, delivers, exchanges, sells, or in any other way transfers to another any nonsterile intravenous or intramuscular drug paraphernalia.
(b) For purposes of this Section:
"HIV" means the human immunodeficiency virus or any other identified
causative agent of acquired immunodeficiency syndrome.
"Intimate contact with another" means the exposure of the body of one person to a bodily fluid of another person in a manner that could result in the
transmission of HIV.
"Intravenous or intramuscular drug paraphernalia" means any equipment,
product, or material of any kind which is peculiar to and marketed for use in
injecting a substance into the human body.
(c) Nothing in this Section shall be construed to require that an infection
with HIV has occurred in order for a person to have committed criminal transmission of HIV.
(d) It shall be an affirmative defense that the person exposed knew that the
infected person was infected with HIV, knew that the action could result in
infection with HIV, and consented to the action with that knowledge.
(e) A person who commits criminal transmission of HIV commits a Class 2
felony.
Id.
81. Id. para. 12-16.2(a). The legislature avoided the patently unfair, and perhaps
unconstitutional, criminalization of innocent transmission.
82. Id. para. 12-16.2(a)(1).
83. Id. para. 12-16.2(b).
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tion.84 Besides blood, tissue, semen, and organs, the statute includes "potentially infectious body fluids."' 85 This catchall
language gives the statute flexibility to respond to the latest medical information regarding means of transmitting HIV. For instance, saliva could fit under the catchall if it were found
definitively capable of transmitting HIV. Finally, certain drug-related activity, such as sharing nonsterile, intravenous, or intramuscular drug paraphernalia, will precipitate prosecution under the
statute.8

Although one diagnosed with HIV must engage in one of the
three enumerated activities to be subject to prosecution under the
statute, the statute does not require that an HIV infection actually
result from the activity. 7
Furthermore, as a defense, the accused may claim that the person alleged to have been exposed to HIV consented to the exposure. 88 This defense forbids those who engage in reckless conduct
themselves from being complaining witnesses after voluntarily
agreeing to engage in such conduct. Moreover, this provision
avoids embroiling the state in highly charged consensual sexual relations cases. The statute is given teeth by penalties ranging from
three to seven years in an Illinois penal institution.8 9
The statute's specificity in dealing with AIDS-related problems
suggests that the statute is an attempt to improve upon the traditional methods of AIDS prosecutions. Therefore, the Illinois statute's potential effectiveness must be analyzed with respect to prior
AIDS prosecutions under traditional criminal sanctions.
IV.

ANALYSIS:

THE ILLINOIS

HIV STATUTE

The statute contains several ambiguities that may create issues in
future litigation. First, the statute does not define how a person
obtains "knowledge" of his HIV condition. Furthermore, the statute fails to specify all of the various methods through which HIV
can be transmitted. Although this lack of specificity may provide
flexibility, it may in some cases become problematic. Finally, as
with, other crimes, sentencing under the statute is subject to some
judicial discretion, but the statute does not address whether the
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. para. 12-16.2(a)(2).
Id.
Id.
Id. para. 12-16.2(c).
Id. para. 12-16.2(e).
Id.
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judge is to weigh one's HIV condition as an aggravating or mitigating factor to his offense.
A. Knowledge Under the Illinois HIV Statute
The provision of the HIV statute open to the most criticism is
the requirement that HIV be transmitted by one who has knowledge of his HIV condition. Knowledge is a familiar requirement in
the criminal law, but in the HIV setting, knowledge may cause
unique problems.
The Illinois legislature emphasizes confidentiality of those tested
for HIV to encourage high risk groups to be treated for HIV. 90
The legislature recognizes that people's misunderstanding of the
test or fear of involuntary disclosure of results often deters them
from being tested for HIV. The HIV statute may add another deterrent. It is plausible that individuals who are at a high risk of
exposure91 may shy away from testing if they know that knowledge
of a positive result may make them susceptible to future criminal
prosecution for their actions. Even people who pose a low risk of
HIV exposure and who otherwise would submit to testing rightfully may be wary of their HIV test results being shared with local
and national law enforcement officials.
Thus, at first glance, the statute appears at odds with the Illinois
legislature's emphasis on the informed, voluntary, and confidential
use of tests to reveal HIV infection. Arguably, the knowledge re90. The Illinois legislature sought to ensure the confidentiality of AIDS test results
through the "AIDS Confidentiality Act." See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, paras. 73017316 (1989). The Act provides in pertinent part:
§ 2. The General Assembly finds that:
(1) The use of tests designed to reveal a condition indicative of Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) infection can be a valuable tool in protecting the
public health.
(2) Despite existing laws, regulations and professional standards which require or promote the informed, voluntary and confidential use of tests designed
to reveal HIV infection, many members of the public are deterred from seeking
such testing because they misunderstand the nature of the test or fear that the
test results will be disclosed without their consent.
(3) The public health will be served by facilitating informed, voluntary and
confidential use of tests designed to reveal HIV infection.
Id. para. 7302.
91. The percentage of AIDS patients in high-risk groups has remained relatively stable since 1981: 65% are homosexual or bisexual; 17% are intravenous drug users; 8%
are members of both groups; 4% have had heterosexual contact with a person with AIDS
or at risk for AIDS, or were born in foreign countries where heterosexual transmission is
common; 3% are hemophiliacs or have had transfusions; and 3% could not be categorized. Hellinger, Forecasting the Personal Medical Care Costs of AIDS from 1988
Through 1991, 103 Pun. HEALTH REP. 309, 310 (1988).
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quirement actually may encourage people who might be deterred
from transmitting the disease to remain without knowledge of their
condition in an effort to avoid criminal prosecution.
Upon closer inspection, this argument ignores the reality of what
people actually know. The deterred testing argument presupposes
that those who are at risk know of the existence of the statute. The
statute is certainly not publicized, and the perceived odds of actually being prosecuted under the statute arguably appear remote to
those targeted. Moreover, with the perceived odds of prosecution
low and the public awareness of the AIDS danger high, people will
continue to have ample incentive to be tested regardless of the potential criminal consequences.
Even if people do not abstain from being tested, the statute's
knowledge requirement poses other problems. One problem is that
prosecutors face the daunting task of showing that the party actually had knowledge of his HIV condition at the time of the alleged
transmission. This problem is compounded by scientific uncertainty about AIDS's incubation period. It is unclear how these
problems will be resolved, and they should prove to be major battlefields for future litigation under the HIV statute.
There is yet another problem with the statute's knowledge requirement. It is unclear whether courts will define knowledge objectively (e.g., through production of a documented HIV test) or
subjectively (e.g., construed from being in a high risk group). The
Illinois courts may take an objective approach and construe knowledge to mean an actual test result. This approach may prove costly
and elusive because it would require law enforcement officials to
track a person's medical history to find out if he had ever submitted to a test. The accused may not fully disclose where or when he
received medical aid or testing, and a one-time visit for a test
would be difficult to track. Therefore, prosecutors would be faced
with a fifty state search that would be nearly impossible for them to
pursue when saddled with large case loads and limited resources.
The task of officially documenting a single test is further complicated by the foreseeable reluctance of testing agencies to violate a
tested person's right to confidentiality and privacy by informing
the prosecution of the test results or even admitting that the accused actually had been tested. The testing agency might require
the accused's consent before it releases testing information. On a
more practical level, Illinois courts and law enforcement officials
may not be able to coerce the release of test results held in other
jurisdictions.
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Conversely, Illinois courts may fashion a subjective approach in
which a person's knowledge of his medical condition, symptoms,
prior sexual encounters, or shared drug use would put him on notice of his HIV infection. This approach would be difficult to manage. This type of inquiry could not be totally subjective because
courts still would have to decide whether a "reasonable person"
would know of his infected status based on his prior activities or
present condition. Moreover, to establish subjective knowledge
would require detailed findings of fact and could reveal damaging
personal information, which could be barred at trial as highly inflammatory and prejudicial in front of a jury.
However, despite the potential ambiguity of the knowledge re'quirement, the statute is an improvement on AIDS-related prosecutions under existing criminal laws. Most importantly, the
statute avoids the pitfalls of having to show "intent" to commit the
underlying crime as required under traditional criminal law proceedings. The problems associated with having to show intent are
aptly demonstrated
by State v. Sherouse92 and Barlow v. Superior
93
Court.

In Sherouse, voluntary manslaughter charges were dismissed
against the defendant who, despite her knowledge that she had
tested positive for HIV and that HIV could be transmitted by sexual intercourse, still attempted to engage in prostitution without
warning her potential clients. The dismissal was based on a failure
to show that Sherouse's actions evinced an intent to kill. Similarly,
the Barlow court denied the prosecution's motion to compel an
HIV test, despite the fact that Barlow had threatened his victims
with the possibility that he might have AIDS. Again, the ruling
was based on the belief that, even if the defendant had HIV, this
would not evince the intent requirement of the underlying crime.
The Illinois HIV statute largely avoids the problems of Sherouse,
Barlow, and other cases that require intent to commit another specific crime. Under the Illinois statute, the HIV-related behavior is
prosecuted directly. The state need not show that the defendant's
actions brought about another crime or were meant to achieve another crime. Thus, the prosecutor is not faced with the dilemma of
deciding with which crime to bootstrap the defendant's conduct.
The HIV statute's improvement on the frustrating approach
92. 536 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989), discussed supra text accompanying
notes 36-43.
93. 236 Cal. Rptr. 134 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987), discussed supra text accompanying notes
29-35.
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used in cases such as Sherouse can be demonstrated by looking at
how the HIV statute would work given the facts of Sherouse. Using the Illinois HIV statute, prosecutors easily could achieve conviction for criminal transmission by showing that Sherouse knew
that she was infected with HIV. Sherouse's intent would not even
be an issue. The state would carry no burden of showing what
Sherouse was trying to do when she engaged in her HIV-related
conduct. Sherouse knew that she was infected, and she knew that
HIV could be spread through sexual intercourse. At the least, she
could be convicted for a Class 2 felony under the Illinois HIV
statute.
Additionally, the statute does not foreclose the prosecutor from
pursuing other specific intent crimes; rather, it provides a clear-cut
choice for prosecution, while simultaneously providing a fallback
position if it becomes clear that the more severe, specific intent
crime were not provable.
The Broad Scope of the Illinois Statute
1. Adaptability to Scientific Evidence
The apparently broad scope of the Illinois statute should be a
fertile battleground for prosecutors seeking to exploit its use and
for defendants seeking to narrow its application. The statute allows for prosecution of the criminal transmission of HIV when a
party engages in "intimate contact with another." 94 "Intimate
contact," in turn, is defined as the "exposure of the body of one
person to a bodily fluid of another person in a manner that could
result in the transmission of HIV." 9 The statute makes no mention of any specific manner by which HIV might be transmitted.
In making its determination as to whether the contact was "in a
manner that could result in the transmission of HIV," the court
apparently must rely on the available state of medical and scientific
knowledge. This assumption is consistent with current reliance on
a wide array of "scientific" evidence that courts now use, such as
fingerprinting and DNA testing. Conceivably, a court could take
judicial notice that certain conduct constitutes "a manner that
could result in the transmission of HIV." 96 A court would, however, still need to make complex factual determinations in deciding
whether the bodily fluids were actually transmitted in a manner
that meets the statutory requirements for transmission. As a reB.

94.
95.
96.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para 12-16.2(a)(1) (1989).

Id. para. 12-16.2(b).
See supra text accompanying note 55. But see supra text accompanying note 56.
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suit, prosecutions under the statute will most likely turn into experts' battles about the possibility of transmission based on the
facts of the case.
Prior cases provide a glimpse of how courts without an HIV
specific statute wrestled with the problems associated with the
manner of transmission. For example, Brock v. State9 ' specifically
addressed the issue of transmission. The Brock court struggled to
determine whether biting could transmit HIV and whether saliva
was truly a transmitting agent. In its final analysis, the court
found the evidence too ill-defined and thus required that the HIVtransmission potential of saliva be specifically demonstrated. This
case illustrated the fact that courts will be reluctant to impose
sanctions when the prosecution cannot provide scientific evidence
that an activity truly can transmit AIDS.
The Illinois courts similarly will be required by the HIV statute's mandate to find that the intimate contact be of a kind scientifically capable of transmitting the disease. The problems of Brock
have not been solved. The Illinois legislature's approach, however,
is adaptable to medical advancements in HIV-transmission research and will encourage a greater overlap between the medical
and legal communities. Illinois courts will only be able to impose
HIV-related penalties for activities that definitively can result in
the potential transmission of HIV. Thus, Illinois courts can accept
new information about HIV transmission while not appearing to
endorse misinformation about the spread of the disease.
1 2.

Preventing Overly Broad Prosecutions

Allowing prosecutions when the defendant's conduct was not
even capable of transmitting HIV can only serve to increase the
mistrust of criminal sanctions for the containment of AIDS and
fuel charges of insensitivity and discrimination by the legal system.
Moreover, the spread of AIDS will not be deterred by prosecution
of those incapable of transmitting the disease.
The problems of overly broad prosecution appeared in State v.
Haines.9 Haines was found guilty of attempted murder after the
court held that his actions, coupled with his belief that his actions
were capable of transmitting HIV, satisfied the substantial-step-towards-murder requirement. The court so ruled after a jury had
97. 555 So. 2d 285 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989), discussed supra text accompanying notes
49-60.
98. 545 N.E.2d 834 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989), discussed supra text accompanying notes
16-28.
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held that there was insufficient evidence of intent to murder. The
jury's decision, presumably, was made in part on the lack of concrete evidence that Haines's conduct-spitting and spraying
blood-was capable of transmitting HIV.
The Illinois statute takes a more enlightened approach to prosecuting AIDS-related conduct. The Illinois statute specifically requires that the contact be "in a manner capable of transmitting
HIV." This broad wording provides a flexible alternative that allows prosecution when the defendant's acts are capable of transmitting HIV, but are not neatly categorized, for example, as assault
with a deadly weapon.
The accused's subjective belief about whether his actions are capable of transmitting infection is of no consequence. Prosecutors
should prefer this approach because the prosecutor need not show
that the accused has any particular expertise on the subject. On
the contrary, the prosecutor need only show that the accused knew
of his condition. Defendants should also prefer this approach because they will not be subject to prosecutions when their subjective
belief does not comport with objective reality.
C. Sentencing

A violation of the Illinois HIV statute is a Class 2 felony."
Thus, the Illinois legislature specifically has provided statutory
guidelines for sentencing a party under the HIV statute. In jurisdictions without HIV-specific statutes, courts have addressed
whether a defendant's HIV condition served as either an aggravating or mitigating factor in sentencing. 10e
Clearly, courts have not reached a consensus on these issues.
They may never reach a consensus. Illinois' statutory approach is
in keeping with this uncertainty. Cases from other jurisdictions
demonstrate the novel theories that may arise in HIV-related cases
at the sentencing stage. The sentencing considerations, therefore,
can be seen as especially fact-intensive in HIV-transmission cases.
Accordingly, Illinois' HIV statute, which provides a range of penalties, provides the needed flexibility for these fact-intensive cases.
V.

CONCLUSION

Although it is difficult to measure AIDS's societal impact, AIDS
99. The sentence for a Class 2 felony shall be not less than 3 years and not more than
7 years. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-1(a)(5) (1989).
100. See, e.g., People v. Watts, 556 N.Y.S.2d 754 (1990), discussed supra text accompanying notes 61-64.
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has entered everyone's world. Politicians pledge that funding for
research and treatment will be bolstered. Billboards urging safe
sex appear on the public transportation systems in Chicago and
cause a political uproar over the messages that they convey.
"AIDS babies" are being brought into the world already marked
with the affliction.
AIDS dramatizations are especially prevalent: a young man,
Ryan White, touches the hearts of the nation, including the nation's heroes, and once again lights the fires of compassion towards
AIDS victims; a tabloid screams at the unfairness that befell a
young, clean-living, upscale girl who contracted HIV and did not
even know it for several years. These high profile events transpire
while news reports relate that AIDS is spreading faster among the
heterosexual population and in smaller cities.
The Illinois legislature has provided state law enforcement officials with a valuable tool in combatting the knowing and deliberate
spread of HIV. The statute is broadly worded so that once a party
is aware of his HIV affliction, he can be subject to criminal sanctions for all behavior that is capable of transmitting the disease. By
failing to specify how the disease may be transmitted, the statute
strikes a healthy balance with future scientific knowledge. Illinois
courts will be able to interpret how the disease can be transmitted
by using the latest medical evidence. Most importantly, the statute
is backed with a testing policy to ensure enforcement. The statute
is not a cure-all, and it has its problems, for example, with the
knowledge requirement and the restrictive sentencing provisions.
Yet the statute can alert those who threaten to spread a plague that
Illinois will not condone such reckless conduct.
The statute is but a minor player in today's world AIDS controversy. The statute will not markedly deter the spread of AIDS, but
it does send a societal message that those who choose to engage in
deliberately damaging behavior that can have multiple, long-range
consequences will themselves share the consequences.
Overall, what is needed is greater education about the dangers of
HIV and AIDS in schools, in churches, and even in prisons. Perhaps a liberalization of thought will promote greater awareness of
the affliction, what to do to avoid its wrath, and what to do once
stricken. The discussions concerning AIDS need to extend beyond
those actually afflicted and permeate our world of thought and
discussion.
MICHAEL IRVING LEONARD

